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 Chapter 5 
 Who Is an Immigrant and Who 
Requires Integration? Categorizing 
in European Policies 
 Liza  Mügge and  Marleen  van der  Haar 
 Introduction 
 The formulation of immigration and integration policies is indispensably tied to the 
naming of immigrants, thereby differentiating between them. Categories form the 
backbone of policies, as they formally defi ne (i)  who is a wanted and  who is an 
unwanted immigrant and (ii)  who requires integration and  who does not. “Immigrants” 
are far from homogeneous. They differ in characteristics such as migration motives 
(e.g., for work, political asylum, or family reunifi cation), type of homeland (e.g., 
Western versus non-Western), and gender and ethnicity. Consequently, some immi-
grants are considered part of an intractable policy issue (Rein and Schön  1977 ; 
Schön and Rein  1994 ), whereas others are not. Whether a group is problematized or 
targeted as in need of integration depends on the combination of characteristics and 
statuses attributed to it. Such characteristics and statuses provide the basis of catego-
ries that defi ne which immigration and integration policies a group is subjected to. 
For instance, integration policies tend to frame ethnic minority women, especially 
Muslims, as victims, while their male spouses and family members may be regarded 
as a threat to the state’s ideals of gender equality since they are presumed to oppress 
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women (Bracke  2011 ; Roggeband and Verloo  2007 ). Such a framing leads to differ-
ent policy outcomes for different groups of immigrants. Emancipation is generally 
seen as the main vehicle for the integration of Muslim women, while integration of 
Muslim men tends to focus on surveillance and control (Razack  2004 ). 
 This chapter draws on a literature review to examine the implications of catego-
rization for immigration and integration trajectories. It examines how categories 
formalized in laws and regulations construct explicit as well as implicit target 
groups. For policy purposes, formal target groups tend to be treated as mutually 
exclusive (Yanow  2003 ). However, policies implicitly differentiate within target 
groups as well, for instance, along lines of religion and class (see also Schrover and 
Moloney  2013 , 255). This chapter is guided by three questions. First, how do poli-
cies construct categorizations? Second, who do policies target explicitly, and who 
do they target implicitly? Third, under what conditions do policy categories (e.g., 
the groups that are considered problematic and “in need of integration”) and terms 
(e.g., guest workers, allochthones, illegals, and asylum seekers) unintendedly ren-
der stereotypes, prejudices, and potential discrimination? The fi rst section outlines 
theoretical perspectives on categories in policymaking. The second section analyses 
who is targeted explicitly and who is targeted implicitly by immigration and integra-
tion policies. In particular, it looks at the two main tracks of European citizens and 
third-country nationals (TCNs). Although policymaking—and therefore the use of 
categories—takes place at multiple levels that sometimes clash (e.g., rejected asy-
lum seekers may be categorized as “unwanted” at the national level, but at the same 
time be accommodated at the local level), this chapter concentrates on the literature 
addressing the supranational and national levels. 
 The Study of Categories and Its Relevance for Policymaking 
 Categories are central organizing structures in all human societies (Hancock  2007 , 
64). They are key in attributing sameness and difference (Stone  2002 , 308), based 
on a combination of ‘achieved and ascribed traits’ (Massey  2007 , 1). Achieved 
characteristics are acquired in the course of living (e.g., being a member of a par-
ticular income class or a university graduate), while ascribed characteristics are set 
at birth (e.g., age and sex) (ibid.). 
 The study of categories is well developed in sociology and public policy. Gender 
studies and migration and ethnic studies focus on categories in their critical assess-
ments of processes of exclusion and discrimination of women, migrants, and ethnic 
minorities. In doing so, scholars in these fi elds examine social stratifi cation, refer-
ring to ‘the unequal distribution of people across social categories that are charac-
terized by differential access to scarce resources’ (ibid.). These resources may be 
material (e.g., wealth), symbolic (e.g., social standing), or emotional (e.g., love). 
Stratifi cation systems, Massey ( 2007 ) argues, order people vertically from a top to 
a bottom. A society’s degree of stratifi cation is typically measured in terms of 
inequality, ‘which assesses the degree of variability in the dispersion of people 
among ranked social categories’ (ibid., 2). 
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 Stratifi cation can be traced in two powerful mechanisms: ‘the allocation of peo-
ple into social categories, and the institutionalization practices that allocate resources 
unequally across these categories’ (ibid.:, 5–6). These mechanisms produce categor-
ical inequality, which is ‘a pattern of social stratifi cation that is remarkably “dura-
ble” in the sense that it is reproduced across time and generations’ (Tilly 1998 cited 
by Massey  2007 , 6). Stereotypes evolving from categorization are usually produced 
by those located at the top of the stratifi cation system, namely, the people who con-
trol the most resources. For instance, whites in the USA have perpetuated negative 
stereotypes of African-Americans as unintelligent, hypersexual, and violent (Massey 
 2007 , 15). Individual members of the stereotyped out-group tend to experience dis-
crimination and exclusion over centuries (ibid.). Categorical mechanisms are thus 
deeply embedded within both the infrastructure of social institutions and cultural 
practices (ibid., xvi). As a result, categorical distinctions affect not only formal pub-
lic settings, but also private life (ibid., 7). 
 States and policymakers use categories to describe social phenomena and turn 
them into policy problems on which they can intervene (Yanow  2003 ). Categories 
in this sense can be considered framing devices, with a frame defi ned as an ‘organiz-
ing principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured 
and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included’ 
(Verloo  2005 , 20). Categories  refl ect social realities, but at the same time  construct 
reality (Yanow  2003 ). State-defi ned categories used in policymaking may construct, 
implicitly or explicitly, ethnicized, gendered, or classed target groups. For instance, 
as a result of labour and postcolonial migration, the Netherlands government identi-
fi ed among others Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans as a categorical 
target group and developed specifi c integration policies for them. Despite the inter-
nal ethnic, racial, and religious diversity within this group, these policies  refl ected 
reality at a certain point in time as immigrants started to organize themselves along 
the categorical units of Dutch integration policy. However, the naming of these 
groups also resulted in the monitoring of them in offi cial statistics. As a result, their 
children—the so-called “second generation”—are also categorized on the basis of 
the country of birth of their parents. In this way their identity is  attributed. 
 Categories are crucial for the formulation of policies, and they are a central point 
of departure in studies of inequality. Categorical inequality may result when those 
in power enact policies that give certain groups more access to resources than others 
and systematically channel social and cultural capital to particular categories of 
people (Massey  2007 , 23). In the context of migration and integration, categories 
are used to defi ne target groups for policies. In some countries such categories are 
ascribed, while in others they are based on “self-identifi cation”. We described above 
the Netherlands’ use of categories based on the birth country of immigrants or their 
parents. In the UK people are asked to themselves choose between a number of 
broad race-based categories and subcategories based on ethnicity. 1 Censuses are a 
powerful tool for states to collect information about the “origin” and mobility of 
their residents. The European Union (EU) 2008 census regulation requires member 
1  www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/measuring-equality/equality/index.html , accessed 13 July 
2014. 
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states to collect information about residents’ country of birth (distinguishing 
between EU and non-EU member states) and country of citizenship (EC  2011 ). This 
has enabled the EU to produce statistics about resident foreigners and foreign-born 
EU citizens. Although this may appear to be a neutral activity, state institutions may 
reorganize these data and allocate identities to residents that are not at all neutral. 
For instance, the Netherlands and Flemish (Belgium) governments have used the 
term “non-Western allochthon” to demarcate the target group for integration poli-
cies (Jacobs and Rea  2012 ; Yanow and Van der Haar  2013 ). In the Netherlands, the 
term is offi cially reserved for persons who themselves or at least one of their parents 
were born in Turkey, Africa, Latin America, or Asia. In practice, this means that 
especially migrants from Muslim countries are considered the problem category 
(Groenendijk  2011 , 22; see also Yanow and Van der Haar  2013 ). The concept of 
allochthon fi rst appeared in a 1971 report on post-Second World War migration 
(Verwey-Jonker  1971 ). The term gained ground in 1984 when the Dutch Central 
Bureau of Statistics started to monitor the lives of migrants and their children. The 
term appears in policy discussions from 1989 onwards (WRR  1989 ). The taxonomy 
it implies, and especially the distinction between Western and non-Western alloch-
thones, creates a hierarchy between individuals based on their country of birth 
(Yanow and Van der Haar  2013 ). Much analysis of categories has been inspired by 
the interpretive study of what is considered to be the problem (diagnosis) and the 
proposed solution (Verloo  2005 ). Studying the diagnostic part of policy texts is a 
useful way to uncover why particular groups are problematized and singled out as 
target groups, while others are not. The target group is usually formulated in refer-
ence to existing social categories, such as race/ethnicity, religion, class, and gender. 
The proposed solution then is captured in policymaking. To understand who are 
targeted explicitly and implicitly by immigration and integration policies the fol-
lowing section examines what we term the “policy chain”, which determines which 
policies immigrants are subjected to from the moment of their arrival. 
 Explicit Target Groups and Implicit Hierarchies 
in the Policy Chain 
 Problematizing the mobility of persons is inherent to the idea of the nation state that 
presupposes unity of territory, state, and citizens (Geiger  2013 , 17). European nation 
states and EU institutions have built systems to regulate who can enter their respec-
tive territories and under what conditions. Increasingly, not only immigration but 
also the integration of migrants is a policy issue. This section discusses the legal 
categories used to defi ne mobile persons and the effect of these categories in direct-
ing a migrant’s route in the policy chain (Fig.  5.1 ). The starting point is a categoriza-
tion by the EU based on a person’s country of origin. Is the person in question a 
citizen of an EU member state or a TCN. This dichotomy leads to divergent paths 
determining whether or not migrants do eventually become the subject of integration 
policy and whether they will gain access to social, political, and economic rights.
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 Route 1: EU Citizens 
 The fi rst step in the policy chain establishes whether a migrant is a member-state 
national or a TCN (Rea et al.  2011 , 10). The legal term “TCN” is based on national-
ity and residence status, not on ethnic origin or culture (Groenendijk  2011 , 34). 
Introduction of the right to free movement of EU citizens (based on the 1985 
Schengen Agreement and 1990 Schengen Convention) and the harmonization of 
migration law and policy (via the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 
1999) had substantial impact on the distinction between migrants who are consid-
ered in need of integration and those who are not. Yet, although these agreements 
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reduced the legal distance between national citizens and member-state nationals 
(ibid.), this does not mean that all Europeans gained equal status. 
 EU policies start from the assumption that EU citizens, when moving to another 
member state as Europeans, are integrated by default. Consequently, integration 
policies and facilities have been designed and implemented for TCNs only. 
Nonetheless, policy debates, and in some cases policies, at the national level and 
even more so at the local level do distinguish between EU citizens. For instance, 
migrant workers from relatively new EU members, such as Poland, Romania, and 
Bulgaria, are to be excluded from integration policies according to EU defi nitions, 
but their lack of “integration” has nonetheless been criticized in public and political 
fora. Migrants from the newer EU member states often face highly nationalized 
demands for integration, including language competence requirements and cultural-
ized and moralized citizenship tests (Favell  2013 , 5). Prior to Britain’s lifting of 
restrictions on migrants from Bulgaria and Romania in January 2014, UK politi-
cians—in direct opposition to the EU’s integration defi nition—proposed a cap on 
social services for European migrants. 2 
 In fact, tensions may result from differences in policy aims between the EU and 
its member states. A striking example is the treatment of the Roma from Bulgaria 
and Romania in France. Whereas EU institutions have, in the context of enlarge-
ment policy, continuously argued for measures to promote the social inclusion of 
the Roma (Parker  2012 , 476), this was disregarded by the French authorities. 
Following riots and clashes between Roma and the French police in July 2010, 
President Sarkozy ordered half of the country’s 539 Roma camps to be cleared to 
restore ‘the republican order’ (ibid., 478). Shortly after, the French government 
expelled more than 1,000 camp inhabitants, sending them back to their countries of 
origin. 3 These actions led to a direct confrontation with the European Commission, 
which interpreted the French actions as an existential threat to the European peace 
project. The EU warned France that it would pursue infringement procedures. The 
Commission’s proceedings against France hinged on
 the fact that France had not fully transposed aspects of the 2004 Directive on free movement 
into its national legislation. This had enabled the country to avoid deploying various safe-
guards specifi ed within this Directive in order to protect EU citizens targeted for removal 
either on the basis of their being a ‘threat to public order or security’ or on the basis of their 
‘insuffi cient [economic] means’ (ibid., 479–480). 
 This example illustrates the clear hierarchy between EU citizens from the West 
and those from Eastern Europe. Favell ( 2013 ) argues that next to familiar targets, 
such as Muslims and undocumented Africans, currently Eastern Europeans (e.g., 
Poles and Romanians) and Southern Europeans (Greek, Portuguese, and potentially 
highly qualifi ed Spaniards and Italians) are included in what he calls the anti- 
immigration tide. Free movement and equal treatment may be guaranteed in legal 
2  www.spiegel.de/international/europe/western-europe-fearful-of-roma-immigrants-from-roma-
nia-and-bulgaria-a-884760.html , accessed on 8 June 2014. 
3  www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frances-expulsion-roma-migrants-test-case-europe , accessed on 
13 July 2014. 
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and political terms, but it is not a ‘sociological reality’ (ibid., 4). Indeed, ‘not all 
 citizens are equal and some passports are better than others’. Hierarchies between 
citizens lead to a ‘new system of global economic stratifi cation’ (Castles  2004 , 223). 
 Route 2: Third-Country Nationals 
 TCNs are categorized on the basis of their admission labels, such as labour migrants, 
asylum seekers, family migrants, refugees, and postcolonial migrants (Schrover and 
Moloney  2013 , 257). Labour migrants are characterized in economic terms. They 
migrate for reason of employment, either on a temporary or permanent basis. Family 
migrants come to form a family (marriage migration) or to be reunited with family 
members (family reunifi cation). This type of migration is highly and explicitly fem-
inized (Bonjour and De Hart  2013 ). Postcolonial and colonial migrants are those 
originating from countries formerly colonized by the country of destination. In 
many cases, they have—or had—a legal right to settle in European countries 
(Hampshire  2013 , 18). Policymakers use these categorizations as mutually exclu-
sive groups. But in reality, these broad classifi cations overlap. People may move 
between categories (ibid., 257) or they may use the policy labels available for their 
migration project. For instance, many of the guest workers who left Greece, Spain, 
and Portugal in the 1960s and early 1970s had political motives to fl ee the regimes 
of colonel Papadopoulos and Makarezos, Franco, and Salazar, respectively. 
Applying for asylum in North and West European countries was cumbersome and 
risky. In those days it was easier to apply for a residence permit for work. 
 Many scholars point to the disproportional problematization of non-European 
immigrants (Rea et al.  2011 ; Favell  2013 ; Schmidtke  2012 ). Schmidtke ( 2012 , 32) 
argues that the term TCN creates a non-European “other” by which the EU repro-
duces a ‘hiatus between the wanted, highly-qualifi ed, ideally Western migrants, and 
the unwanted ones from the non-European world’. The distinction made between 
wanted and un-wanted follows a ‘utilitarian logic’ of the country’s economic com-
petitiveness (ibid.). The difference between wanted and unwanted TCN immigrants 
comes clearly to the fore through visa procedures. Rules of visa application make 
use of so-called “positive” and “negative” lists to distinguish between TCNs that 
need a visa to travel to the EU Schengen area and those who do not (Groenendijk 
 2011 , 24). Central databases have been created to collect information about non- 
nationals, especially since the 2004 and 2007 directives on legal migration. The 
introduction of these immigration databases 4 is legitimated as a security and safety 
4  Groenendijk ( 2011 , 33–34) refers to three databases. The fi rst, the Schengen Information System 
(SIS; SIS-II is the new version which includes the possibility of using biometrics) enables exchange 
of data about suspected criminals, people who may not have the right to enter the EU, missing 
persons, and stolen, misappropriated, or missing property. Second, EURODAC is a system for 
comparing fi ngerprints of asylum seekers and some illegal migrants. Third the Visa Information 
System (VIS) enables Schengen countries to exchange visa data. 
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measure linked to the political context of the fi ght against terrorism, other serious 
crime, and illegal immigration (ibid., 33). The lists are said to be based on criteria 
such as potential security risk, illegal immigration, and economic relations. The 
result is that the “positive” list consists of ‘rich countries and countries in Europe 
and the Americas with predominantly white populations’ (ibid.). Besides the 
implied distinction based on class and race/ethnicity, the lists also mark a religious 
watershed, as in practice they also distinguish between Muslim and Christian popu-
lations (ibid.). 
 Route 2a: Legal Immigrants and Target of Integration Policy 
 The group of immigrants that is allowed formal access becomes legal and a target 
of integration policy. Particular measures in current integration and immigration 
policy practice appear to spotlight female migrants (on women marriage migrants, 
see Bonjour and De Hart  2013 ; on gender inequality as an ethnicized problem see 
Roggeband and Verloo  2007 ; Prins and Saharso  2008 ), while migrant masculinity is 
often problematized (Van der Haar  2013 ; Scheibelhofer  2012 ). Bonjour and De Hart 
( 2013 ) suggest that the Netherlands’ policymaking on marriage migration is shaped 
by the idea of transnational marriages being fraudulent and forced, and (Muslim) 
migrant women being the victims of these practices. Scheibelhofer ( 2012 ) sets out 
how the image of an “archaic migrant masculinity” is used to legitimate restrictive 
migration laws in Austria: the human capital, norms, and values of migrant men 
have become criteria for their classifi cation as wanted or unwanted. The general 
discourse that becomes clear from the abovementioned studies is that women 
migrants need to be protected by the “receiving state”, whereas migrant men mainly 
need to be controlled. In these cases, “marked identities” (Yanow  2003 ) again based 
on homogenized social categories like race/ethnicity, gender, class, and religion 
(often replicated in research as static analytical categories) are reproduced. 
Furthermore, negative and pejorative assumptions about groups are especially high-
lighted, resulting in a singling out of particular immigrants to be targeted by particu-
lar measures. 
 Religion and most certainly Islam is another important factor in prioritizing 
women migrants as a target group in policies. These women are associated with 
problems ranging from honour related violence, forced and arranged marriages, 
genital mutilation, and domestic violence to low labour market participation. 
Migrant women with a Muslim background are portrayed as victims of patriarchal 
cultures informed by Islam. As many European states perceive themselves as lib-
eral, these women are targeted in family-related migration policies and integration 
policies that aim to transmit norms of gender equality (see Bonjour and De Hart 
 2013 on the Netherlands; for a comparative study on seven EU countries, see 
Kofman et al.  2013 ). But again, assumptions about class, in the form of low educa-
tion and backwardness, are used to legitimize restrictions in family migration and 
strict measures of cultural assimilation into the destination society through state 
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integration policies. Razack ( 2004 ), for example, argues that Norway’s culturalist 
approach to forced marriages enables the stigmatization and surveillance of Muslim 
communities and feeds the idea of European superiority. The assumed causalities in 
the diagnoses underlying policy issues may thus have highly exclusionary 
consequences. 
 Critical scholars have stressed the risk of homogenizing, and hereby essential-
izing, identities in policy and research (e.g., Rath  1991 ; Ghorashi  2006 ; Schinkel 
 2007 ; Bertossi and Duyvendak  2012 ; Jacobs and Rea  2012 ). The main concern is 
that categories defi ned in policies at the supranational or state level produce or rein-
force stereotypes that foster prejudices and potential discrimination. The following 
examples show how the dichotomy allochthon and autochthon and subcategories in 
the Netherlands and Flanders have produced durable stereotypes. These stereotypes 
are products of the formal policy chain and—as Massey ( 2007 ) reminds us—affect 
private life, but are increasingly contested by the children and grandchildren of 
immigrants. 
 “Allochthon” and its counterpart “autochthon” have taken on a for-granted char-
acter in Dutch and Flemish politics, administration, and society (Jacobs and Rea 
 2012 ; Van der Haar and Yanow  2011 ; De Zwart  2012 ). However, changes are visi-
ble at the local level, at the insistence of a new generation of “allochthones”. The 
city of Ghent, for instance, declared the twin concepts “dead and buried” on the 
international day against racism (Severs  2014 ). This marked the offi cial end of the 
allochthon-autochthon distinction in the administrative jargon of the municipality. 
 Since the 1980s, the Netherlands has developed an international reputation as a 
multicultural society due in part to its efforts to promote integration of ethnic minor-
ities while also enabling them to maintain their culture. This resulted in group- 
specifi c policies for the largest immigrant groups, among them Turks, Moroccans, 
Surinamese, Antilleans, Moluccans, and Southern Europeans (Vermeulen and 
Penninx  2000 ). Both the general term “ethnic minorities” and its various subcatego-
ries became deeply rooted in daily life, though they have not gone uncontested by 
substantial numbers of the people labelled in these terms. For instance, during a 
local election rally in March 2014, Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch populist 
right-wing party PVV, asked the gathered crowd whether there should be “fewer 
Moroccans” in the Netherlands. In an indignant response, Dutch citizens of 
Moroccan descent started a Twitter campaign under the hashtag “BornHere”. They 
posted “selfi es” defi antly showing their Dutch passports. 5 In the ensuing days, 
Dutch politicians, organizational leaders, comedians, and individual citizens of 
Moroccan descent mobilized and fi led thousands of discrimination complaints 
against Wilders. 6 This attracted wide support of the established white political elite 
in praise of the outspoken Moroccan-Dutch activism. This activism takes on even 
greater symbolic weight in light of Morocco’s citizenship law: Moroccans cannot 
renounce their Moroccan passport. The Dutch-Moroccan activists thus made a 
5  See  www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/03/dutch-far-right , accessed on 4 April 2014. 
6  See  www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/dutch-politician-geert-wilders-moroccans-out-
rage-pvv-party-anti-islam , accessed on 4 April 2014. 
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 public choice for the Netherlands. They were fed up with being seen as Moroccan. 
Ethnic minority students at academic institutions across Western countries, such as 
Harvard, Oxford, and the University of Amsterdam launched a similar campaign: “I 
too am [name of the university].” Here, ethnic minority students were portrayed 
holding handwritten signs quoting implicit or explicit discriminatory comments 
they experienced on a daily basis (e.g., on forced marriage, skin colour, and lan-
guage skills). 7 
 The message is clear: the children and grandchildren of immigrants represent a 
new generation of highly educated and eloquent citizens who no longer accept 
being seen as second-class citizens judged merely on their immigrant backgrounds. 
They are not  different. The #BornHere and “I too” campaigns point to the develop-
ment of stereotypes based on assumptions of a poorly integrated fi rst-generation 
immigrant who lived in a parallel society and aimed to return home as soon as pos-
sible. These are not stand-alone examples, but are part of a broader ethnic minority 
stance against being seen and treated as outsiders by the majority population, “even 
after two generations” (Andriessen et al.  2007 , 107; Entzinger and Dourleijn  2008 
cited by De Zwart  2012 , 312). 
 Route 2b: Legal Immigrants and Target of Return Policy 
 Undocumented migration and the entry of asylum seekers are driven by forces—
such as transnational networks—that governments cannot control (Castles  2004 , 
205). Although the issue of asylum was actually an important incentive for the EU 
to harmonize migration-related policies (see Penninx and Scholten in this volume), 
it has proven diffi cult to address the root causes of migration, not least because of 
the different objectives of the various EU bodies and member states (Castles  2004 , 
223). Undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers who are not granted residence 
permits become the target of return policies. In many European states, unsuccessful 
asylum seekers may be transferred to “detention and removal centres” (on the UK 
see Sales  2002 ; on Sweden see Khosravi  2009 ); others become “illegals” trying to 
live their lives without formal papers. The EU deportation regime has received par-
ticular public attention regarding the position of women (as mothers) and children. 
In Norway, the UK, Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands media have featured 
stories of children who have been sent “back”—sometimes forcibly (Fekete  2005 ). 
Scholars also point to an increasing proportion of asylum seekers being traffi cked as 
a result of restrictive policies (Koser  2000 ). Here again, women and children are 
especially targeted in protective policies, for example, as a result of the 2000 United 
Nations Protocol to Suppress, Prevent and Punish Traffi cking, Especially Women 
and Children (Hastie  2013 ). 
 Undocumented immigrants are vulnerable and caught in between different pol-
icy layers. Formally they are excluded from integration policies, but at the same 
7  See  http://itooamuva.tumblr.com/ , accessed on 15 April 2014. 
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time many are informally incorporated by local institutions such as schools, 
churches, and associations (for an overview of literature on this category see 
Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas  2012 ). As Castles ( 2004 , 223) argues, ‘[policies] 
that claim to exclude undocumented workers may often really be about allowing 
them in through side doors and back doors, so that they can more readily be 
exploited’. At the same time, expelled migrants are attracted by the demand for the 
fl exible labour facilitated by the large informal economy in countries such as Greece 
(Fakiolas  2003 ). 
 The presence of undocumented migrants and opportunities for them to settle 
vary widely across European member states. Hellgren ( 2014 ) argues that undocu-
mented migrants are more accommodated in Spain than in Sweden. Until 1 July 
2013 undocumented migrants in Sweden had—in contrast to recognized asylum 
seekers—no right to basic healthcare and schooling for their children. This was 
amended under pressure of the United Nations, which criticized Sweden for violat-
ing human rights conventions (ibid., 1180). In Spain undocumented migrants are 
documented at the  local level . They have the same access to schooling and, up to 
2012, healthcare as anyone else (Garcés-Mascareñas  2012 , 121, 209). Moreover, 
Spain has a larger informal population than Sweden. Undocumented migrants in the 
former fi ll a major “care gap”, providing cheap labour in healthcare, childcare, and 
domestic services. While in Sweden undocumented migrants ‘refl ect a moral 
dilemma and challenge to the principles of the welfare state’, in Spain ‘the presence 
of individuals without permission to stay may not be problematic for any moral 
reasons, or by principle’ (Hellgren  2014 , 1184). 
 Conclusion 
 Categories form the backbone of policies. This chapter examined how categories 
are constructed in immigration and integration policies, alongside who policies tar-
get and in what ways categorizing may lead to stereotypes and exclusion. Processes 
of categorization both refl ect reality and construct identities as they are understood 
by the ethnic majority. Categories furthermore determine the policy route migrants 
are subjected to upon their arrival. At the EU level the basic binary categorization is 
EU citizen versus TCN, and this defi nes who requires integration (TCNs) and who 
does not (EU citizens). Although European citizens are not formally subject to inte-
gration policy, Western European immigration countries do make implicit distinc-
tions between migrants from “new” and “old” member states. In other, words, not 
all intra-European migrants are as equal in daily life as they are on paper. Migrants 
from the Eastern European member states are categorized differently. TCNs—i.e., 
migrants from outside the EU—form the general target group of EU integration 
policies as well as return and deportation measures. TCNs who are legal, or at least 
admitted, become the target of integration policies. Others become the object of 
increasingly exclusionary social policies and deportation. 
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 Hierarchies within the categories European citizens and TCNs produce implicit 
and sometimes explicit unequal treatment at the national and local levels. Some 
groups, such as Muslims, are more problematized than others, and hierarchies are 
often based on a combination of identity markers such as gender, class, and ethnic-
ity. Hierarchies are bound to national contextual factors, such as the mode of catego-
rization used (top-down or based on self-identifi cation), the type of welfare state, 
the scope of certain types of immigration, and the extent to which immigrants are 
“needed” to fi ll gaps in the labour market. Categories create stereotypes that persist 
over generations, resulting in patterns of social stratifi cation. Categories cannot be 
abandoned in policymaking, but to make policies more effective scholars and poli-
cymakers alike should be alert to their use, scope, and impact.
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